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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SUGARHOUSE FINANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
EUGENE L. ANDERSON and 
COLLEEN W. ANDERSON, 
Defendant-Respondent, 
Case No. 16462 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
On December 17, 1976, Plaintiff-Appellant, Sugar-
house Finance Company (hereafter "Sugarhouse"), obtained a · 
judgment against Defendants-Respondents, Eugene L. Anderson 
and Colleen W. Anderson (hereafter "Andersons"), for the 
default of a Promissory Note (R. 22-23). On January 31, 
1979, Eugene L. Anderson (hereafter "Anderson") approached 
Sugarhouse to settle the judgment. Anderson alleged that a 
valid settlement had been reached and that it should be 
enforced by the Court. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Honorable Christine M. Durham granted Ander-
sons' motion to enforce the alleged settlement agreement, 
and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
to that effect. 
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'.)?.s'JRELIEF ~UGHT-m1 APPEAL 
-• .f'~ . 
Appellant Sugarhouse Financ.E;; Company prays for re-
, .. '-•,-; 
versal '{)f ·the· trial court's order th~t~:~here wa~i{ val-~d and 
enforceable settlement a~reeme!lt, fb"'r the satisfaction;~f the 
1 
·-appeTlant's judgment or, in the alternative, i.pr a new 
\ ,,. , . . -. .,,:·, . 
trial, and that appelJ,ant be awarded ,sos ts on appeal. 
-~ .... y-. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
' ·~ ., )j 1 ~· ·~i r1 
On July' 7, <1"976·, Sugarhcuse filed a complaint 
. . 
~..::--· - • .·r --· ...-. -
against Anderson clai.I11i11g the default of a promissory note 
- :,_ ;5 _, ,_l . ;__;c.._.c. '.:;'t~'£. ;.,;:.· ~ -i l :- .;,"- ~:::;. .-rLI: 
- ·· ~R. 2-5). Judg_me_nt. w~s 0eRte_red in.- t?vor' of Sugarhous~h 
-· :;r-;J·~"I"?--:; .• L ·"\ ... , . -,-t :}·\a.::c. ~~:.,.... ~. - ~ 71 ; _·· 
. ;,;;a'l~n:..s:t' A~~er·;·~~J~_~f.;.Pe_~~?"1~,?/ ~9?6 •. ~/The jud?mept_ ~.~ 
large part remains unsatisfied ,..,(R. 8.~(l.: ',.':':: 
·: ~ -~ r L l.. t~·\. ... _ -~a,-;tr~ A_, • ?~': .,.,-·> . , ·~f:;~:! .. 
On January _29, }.~79J An51ers<1J!1.s were _,s~ryed w,jth an 
, ,:'l •<:i+"'' , I•·· . ·, .l. ). ~,:: 'b"~a~i~ ln Suppleme~tal P~ocee4J.Jlst.~- orderi~ ~.¥em,t:o api,l}ffer in 
:_ ;4...f_.: &~ ... ,_ :..°' . - ,. n, ..... • ·tr·-·· ~i?-., ...:· -·.. ·:_· '"' _-·.'..... . t / ~ ... : -·~- • 
. court on February 20, 1979, 1an,d.,-~swer_ qi;~~~lPfir:c'?pc~rnrng ~~.j.> t .. .., "~,·. '1~ ·:.4-, 3 ~', ;,~-:_ ~·-~·-~_;.ft£,·."".' ;:_-_., · ;r~ --~-_;. -' ~.- ·~r;, ,-; th~fr 'property (R. 35-37, 38, 90). ·{ , - ·" 
!i ,.. <) :' )-; (. __ ,.·; ·-· _;;..;:,~.: -- . - ' ' ' t-,\;,e 
On January 31, 1979, Eugene An~erson trav~Ied to 
-'fy:-~ .. ,-~:jT ,·~r~ 
-- .- ' • ·1 
Salt Lake City, Utah, and met with Neuman Petty,' P·resident 
. ·r..o:-:·~.-i . . 
of Sugarhouse_Fina!!CE7 Company JR. 3.B, .90~ 94, 114)., J1:r~ 
.... .· .. ·' . ~:, l"'~ ~gwi_ ~:<· ~-<'; !~-:.":''" c . : . 
Anderson's purpose in rneetfog ~ith Mr. J?~tty.'.\'.,,as ,. t,~, sE'.ttle ):, . --~~l-}: ~(TtC'.:o,-: - _- r·.~ ... 1-t ~t~--,- -~:/_:·.·-~·r· .~;t - ..:[i' .... ·:, ·. ·- ' ' ''l ~L) 
- "the ·judgment previously enterec;l,.i~,this·case rn .. ~5). · .At 
., ~ !·4i::~tr~ ... · ..ii:·.nt:·.-~,,... ·- ' ::.e-• "'~ :_ .~~ :. , )"--;' ' · -. · _;-_-
.. 'this ,~e~ti;g, Euge_ne A.n.4~.;i;son _ipformed Mr. Petty that he had 
U~\fC :~~i;..:"~ " - . '"" ~--1.' . ·-
experlenced health problems resulting in extreme medical 
expenses (R. 95-96, 101), and that he was presently consid-
ering taking out bankruptcy as he was under a great deal of 
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financial pressure (R. 96, 101). Mr. Anderson represented 
to Mr. Petty that he did not have any assets (R. 118). 
Based upon Anderson's representations, Anderson and Sugar-
house agreed to settle the judgment for the sum of $2,200.00 
(R. 38, 90, 111-112, 115). 
After negotiating this agreement with Appellant, 
Anderson tendered a check payable to Neuman C. Petty, per-
sonally (R. 90, 119). The check was dated January 31, 1979, 
and was drawn on Zions First Natio_nal Bank, Salina, Utah, 
with the notation "payment in full, judgment Civil No. 
236207." (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, a-nd R. 38, 90). 
After negotiations were completed, Anderson in-
formed Sugarhouse that he did not have sufficient funds in 
his account to cover the check but that he would attempt to 
make arrangements with his bank to obtain payment (R. 104, 
115, 119). Anderson indicated he would call Mr. Petty the 
following day to report on whether or not the check would be 
honored (R. 115, 119). Respondent Eugene Anderson did not 
telephone Appellant on February 1, 1979, but did contact Mr. 
Petty on the following day (R. 91, 115, 119). 
Prior to being served with the Order in Supple-
mental Proceedings, Anderson was in the process of closing a 
real estate transaction (R. 90, 99, 110). Anderson and one 
Keith Cannon owned an interest in twelve acres of real 
property located in Aurora, Sevier County, Utah, and were 
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attempting to sell four acres of said property to a third 
party (R. 99, 107, 108). Anderson was cognizant of Sugar-
house's judgment being a cloud upon the title of the Ander-
son-Cannon property (R. 90, 99, 111). Anderson knew that 
the real estate sale could not be closed until the judgment 
was satisfied (R. 90-91, 110-111). All monies for the 
completion of the real estate transaction had been deposited 
in escrow pending the resolution of Sugarhouse's judgment 
against Andersons (R. 109-110). Anderson was to receive 
approximately $2,000 from the closing of the transaction (R. 
90-91, 107). The existence of the real property and the 
pending real estate transaction was not disclosed to Sugar-
house (R. 91, 99-100). 
After meeting with Respondent Anderson, Petty 
received a telephone call from a title company indicating 
that Anderson was in the process of selling a parcel of real 
property (R. 116). The title company requested a release 
from the Sugarhouse Finance Company judgment (R. 116). Mr. 
Petty declined to provide the title company with the re-
quested ·release (R. 116). 
On the morning of February 2, 1979, Sugarhouse re-
turned the check for $2,200.00 to Anderson by mail (R. 91, 
116). Later that same date, Anderson telephoned Sugarhouse 
(R. 91, 115-116). Petty informed Anderson that his check 
had been returned and that Sugarhouse would not accept the 
check as settlement of the judgment as Anderson had not been 
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candid with him regarding Anderson's financial status during 
their settlement negotiations (R. 91, 100, 111, 117). 
Respondent received the check by mail on February 3, 1979 
(R. 38). 
On February 8, 1978, Andersons filed a pleading in 
the same action,entitled "Motion", requesting the Court for 
"an order requir~ng the plaintiff to carry·out and complete 
the terms of the settlement entered into by the parties on 
January 31, 1979" (R. 40-42). The Court heard Andersons' 
motion, as well as the Court's order in supplemental pro-
ceedings, on March 13, 1979. At the hearing, counsel for 
Sugarhouse objected to the hearing of Andersons' motion on 
the grounds that the matter was not properly before the 
Court, that a summary hearing of the issues presented in the 
motion was not proper, and that the Court lacked jurisdic-
tion to entertain the issues raised by Andersons' motion (R. 
63-64). The Court granted the Motion and entered Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order to the effect that 
Sugarhouse must accept the sum of $2,200.00 as full satis-
faction of the judgment. On May 9, 1979, Sugarhouse moved 
the Court for a new trial and relief from the Court's order 
relating to the hearing of March 13, 1979 (R. 66-67). In 
response to Sugarhouse's motion, the Court held a hearing 
and thereafter entered Amended Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law (R. 89-92). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE FINDINGS OF FACT DO NOT SUPPORT THE COURT'S 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER. 
The trial court entered certain findings in its 
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 90-91). 
Pertinent to this appeal are all such Findings and Conclu-
sions, but especially Findings 6, 7, 8 and 12, as follows: 
6. At the time defendant was served with the 
supplemental order referred to in paragraph 2 hereof, 
defendant was anticipating the closing of a sale of 
real property in which he had one-half interest as a 
tenant in common, and from which defendant Eugene L. 
Anderson was to receive $2,000 after payment of the 
underlying indebtedness. 
7. Defendant Eugene L. Anderson knew that plain-
tiff's judgment had been docketed as a judgment lien 
upon all real property belonging to defendants or in 
which they had an interest in Sevier County. 
8. Defendant Eugene L. Anderson did not disclose 
to President of plaintiff the fact that he had an 
interest in property, that the property had been sold, 
and that he was anticipating the closing of the sale of 
property and that defendant Eugene L. Anderson was to 
receive the sum of $2,000 from the sale thereof. (R. 
90-91.) 
12. The agreement entered into by the parties on 
January 31, 1979, was based on an adequate considera-
tion and was fully executed by each of them at the time 
of its inception. (R. 91.) 
Finding No. 12 as quoted above of is actually a 
conclusion of law. There is no evidence nor are there 
findings to support a conclusion of consideration. This 
point is discussed in Point I.A of Appellant's Brief. 
Findings of Fact Nos. 6 through 8, inclusive, to-
gether with the record which shows misrepresentation on 
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the part of Anderson, are cited as the basis of Point I.B of 
Appellant's Brief. 
A. The Settlement Agreement Lacked Consideration to 
Support an Accord and Satisfaction. 
On January 29, 1979, Anderson met with Sugarhouse's 
President, Mr. Neuman C. Petty, in an attempt to settle 
Sugarhouse's undisputed and liquidated judgment of Decem-
ber 17, 1976. A~derson informed Mr. Petty· that he did not 
have any assets and was caught in a difficult financial 
situation. Based upon such representations (and others 
discussed in Point I.B hereof), Mr. Petty on behalf of 
Sugarhouse agreed to settle the judgment for a compromise 
sum of $2,200.00. Upon reaching this agreement based upon 
Anderson's representations, Anderson tendered Sugarhouse a 
check for $2,200.00. Anderson then informed Sugarhouse's 
President that he did not have sufficient funds in his 
account to cover the check. Anderson stated he would 
telephone Mr. Petty after contacting the bank and apprise 
Mr. Petty of whether or not the bank would honor the check. 
Anderson did not call Mr. Petty on February 1, 1979. Mr. 
Petty did not attempt to negotiate the check,· but rather 
returned the settlement check to Anderson on the morning of 
February 2, 1979, and the check was received by Anderson on 
February 3, 1979. When Anderson telephoned Mr. Petty on 
February 2, 1979, Mr. Petty informed Anderson that the 
settlement agreement was rescinded and that the settlement 
check had previously been returned to Anderson. 
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An accord and satisfaction is a new contract 
between the debtor and creditor which must be supported by 
consideration as one of four essential elements of the 
contract. See Ralph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building 
& Loan Association, 94 Utah 97, 75 P.2d 669, 676 (1938). 
See also 1 Am.Jur.2d, Accord and Satisfaction, §12 at 310-
311 (1962). With .regard to the subject of consideration, 
the Badger court cited the rule as follows: 
"An accord is an agreement between parties, one to 
give or perform, the other to receive or accept, 
such agreed payment or performance in satisfaction 
of a claim. The "satisfaction" is the consumma-
tion of such agreement. Where the claim is 
definite and no dispute but an admittance of its 
owing, the agreement to take a lesser amount even 
followed by satisfaction is not good unless at-
tended by some consideration." (75 P.2d at 676.) 
See also F.M.A. Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., 17 
U.2d 80, 404 P.2d 670, 672-673 (1965); 1 Am.Jur.2d, Accord 
and Satisfaction, §12 at 310-311 (1962). 
This Court in Tates, Inc. v. Little America Re-
fining Co., 535 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1975), held that defendant's 
evidence failed to amount to an accord and satisfaction of 
the claim for the sale of a motor vehicle. Although the 
matter before the Court concerned a disputed claim, the 
Court articulated principles of law which are helpful in 
resolving the issue before this Court: 
Ordinarily, the payment of part of a debt does not 
discharge it; and this is true even though the 
paying debtor exacts a promise that it will do so, 
The reason for this is that in making the part 
payment, the debtor is doing nothing more than he 
is legally obligated to do, and therefore he gives 
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the creditor no consideration for the promise that 
the part payment will be accepted to discharge the 
entire debt. (535 P. 2d at 1229.) 
The Court proceeded to hold that a further requirement of an 
accord and satisfaction is that there be a dispute or uncer-
tainty as to the amount due. The case before this Court in-
valves an undisputed, liquidated claim. Therefore, as a 
matter of law, a payment for less than the full amount does 
not constitute valid consideration. See also Clark Leasing 
Corp. v. White Sands Forest Products, Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 535 
P.2d 1077, 1079 (1975), wherein the Court rejected the 
debtor's defense of accord and satisfaction for an undis-
puted, liquidated claim and held that "an agreement on the 
part of one to do what he is already legally bound to do is 
not sufficient consideration for the promise of another." 
Similarly, the Court in Parmeter v. Delk, 433 
S.W.2d 941 (Ct.Civ.App. Texas, 1968), held that the cashing 
of a check marked "payment in full" which was drawn for less 
than the full amount of the liquidated debt does not consti-
tute an accord and satisfaction because it lacked consid-
eration. 
In case of liquidated claims, where the full 
amount of the claim is not paid and no additional 
or substituted consideration is shown, no accord 
or satisfaction results. • Also the mere 
payment and acceptance of a sum of money less ~han 
the amount of an undisputed indebtedness due, in 
full satisfaction of the debt, does not, for want 
of consideration constitute an accord and satis-
faction and doe~ not bar the creditor's suit to 
recover' the balance. (433 S.W.2d at 944; citation 
omitted.) 
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In addition, Anderson tendered a check to Sugar-
house without sufficient funds to authorize the payment of 
the check from Anderson's bank account. It is well es tab-
lished that a worthless instrument has no value and does not 
constitute consideration for the purpose of establishing a 
contractual agreement. See Dakota Transfer & Storage Co.~ 
Merchants National Bank & Trust Co., 86 N. W. 2d 639, 643, 64~ 
(N.D. 1957); 11 Am.Jur.2d, Bills and Notes, §236 at 264 
(1963). 
The instant debt was an undisputed and liquidated 
claim as evidenced by the judgment of December 17, 1976. 1/ 
agreement by Sugarhouse as creditor does not discharge the 
whole debt as the creditor receives what he is entitled ~ 
and there is no consideration for any new agreement. See 
F.M.A. Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., supra, 404 P.2dl 
at 672-73. A partial payment, although offered as payment 
in full, does not operate as a satisfaction. See F.M.A. 
Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., supra, 404 P.2d 670 
(1965); Ralph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building and LoM 
Association, supra; A. Corbin, 6 Corbin on Contracts, §12811 
at 135 (1962). I 
The case before the Court presents no basis fora 
I 
finding of consideration. There is no dispute to be settlec! 
as the amount in controversy is a liquidated, undisputed 
claim. In sum, the record is devoid of any new considera· 
tion by the debtor which would amount to an accord and 
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satisfaction. The tender of a check for an amount less than 
the full judgment is merely the performance, in part, of a 
present obligation, and does not constitute new considera-
tion. 
B. Any Settlement Agreement Between the Parties Was 
Tainted by Fraud, Misrepresentation or Deceit and 
Therefore Subject to Rescission. 
Anderson and the President of Sugarhouse met to 
discuss the liquidated claim of Sugarhouse, namely the 
judgment of Sugarhouse against Anderson. Anderson repre-
sented to Petty that he was heavily in debt and did not have 
any assets. Based upon these representations and others, 
Sugarhouse agreed to accept $2,200.00 as a full settlement 
of its judgment against Andersons. Anderson failed to 
.disclose to Sugarhouse the fact that he was in the process 
of closing a real estate transaction from which he would 
personally realize approximately $2,000.00. Sugarhouse was 
only apprised of Anderson's real estate holdings when Mr. 
Petty received a telephone call from the title company which 
was closing the transaction. At the time Anderson met with 
the President of Sugarhouse, Anderson was aware of the fact 
that Sugarhouse's judgment was a cloud upon the title of 
this property and the sale of the real property could not be 
closed until the judgment was satisfied. 
Only Anderson an.a his business associates and 
agents were aware of the existence of the previously de-
scribed real estate transaction. Sugarhouse relied upon 
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Anderson's representations that he had no assets as being 
true when Sugarhouse agreed to accept settlement of the 
judgment in an amount less than the judgment. Where such 
representations were untrue and known by Anderson to be 
untrue at the time they were made, the accord and satisfac-
tion based upon such representation is not binding. See 
Ralph A. Badger ~ Co. v. Fidelity Building and Loan Associ~ 
tion, 94 Utah 97, 75 P.2d 669, 679 (1938). 
It is well established by Utah case law that an 
accord and satisfaction of a liquidated debt procured by 
fraud or misrepresentation is not binding upon the parties. 
In Ralph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building and Loan Asso-
ciation, supra, Badger brought an action to recover the 
difference between the face amount of a certificate and the 
amount Badger had received for the certificate from Atlas 
Realty"co., an agent of Fidelity. Badger's claim was for a 
liquidated amount as evidenced by the certificate and Fideli 
admitted to owing Badger the stated amount. When the certi-
ficates matured, Badger sought to redeem the certificates 
for the~r stated value. Badger was informed that the certi-
ficates were not due and payable as there were $50,000 of 
withdrawals ahead of Badger's certificate and, second, that 
Fidelity had decided to pay off certain creditors' obliga-
tions before disbursing funds for stock withdrawals. Fidell 
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then offered fifty percent of the face value of the certifi-
cate in exchange for surrender of the certificate. The 
information conveyed to Badger was not true and Fidelity 
knew that it was not true. Badger relied upon the fraudu-
lent information as evidenced by his surrendering of the 
certificate and accepting less than the full amount. Based 
upon the informa~ion conveyed to Badger this Court held as 
follows: 
Where the accord and satisfaction relied upon 
was procured by fraud or misrepresentation ... , 
it is not binding 
We conclude, from what has been said, that 
there was no accord and satisfaction binding upon 
plaintiff, and that in the facts of this case, it 
would be highly unjust to permit the defendant to 
retain that which otherwise should have been paid 
to plaintiff. We do not find anything in the 
record that should estop plaintiff from recovering 
the balance unpaid on the certificate. The 
records of the defendant revealed that plaintiff's 
certificate was due and payable and defendant had 
funds on hand with which to pay it. (75 P.2d at 
678-9; citations omitted.) 
To be valid, a contract of accord and satisfaction 
must have been consummated fairly and honestly; if procured 
by fraud or misrepresentation, it is voidable at the option 
and instance of the aggrieved party and may be rescinded 
upon discovery of the facts provided the aggrieved party 
acts promptly. 1 Am.Jur.2d, Accord and Satisfaction, §24 at 
322-23, citing Ralph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building 
and Loan Association. 
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In Whitney v. Richards, 17 Utah 226, 53 P. 1122 
(1898), Richards defaulted on a promissory note and pleaded 
accord and satisfaction as a defense to the collection 
action by Whitney. The alleged settlement agreement of the 
parties was based upon false representations by Richards. 
Whitney was informed by Richards that she would probably be 
unable to callee~ the liquidated amount of the note unless 
she agreed to the settlement. Real property was to be 
deeded ta the creditor about which Richards made misrepre-
sentations as to the value of the land, its potential rental 
value, and also failed to declare that the title was encum-
bered with trust deeds. The Court held that the alleged 
accord and satisfaction was obtained by fraudulent repre-
sentations which Whitney relied upon and that such fraud 
authorized Whitney to disaffirm and rescind the settlement 
agreement. 
It is hornbook law that fraud is a sufficient 
basis for the vacation or reformation of an accord. See 
A. Corbin, 6 Corbin on Contracts, §1292 at 178 (1962). 
See also. 47 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, §1036 at 113 (1969); 
Annot., Grounds for Vacation of Satisfaction of Judgment, 51 
A.L.R. 243, 244 (1927). Where one party has superior means 
of ascertaining the facts relating to a settlement agreement 
and fails to disclose the true state of affairs to the oth~ 
party, the lack of disclosure may be treated as fraud and 
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may constitute a basis for invalidating a compromise settle-
ment. See Creson v. Carmody, 310 Ky. 861, 222 S.W.2d 935 
(1949). 
In this case, the Court specifically found that 
Anderson failed to disclose to Sugarhouse the fact that 
Andersons had assets and that the closing of a sale of the 
real property was. awaiting satisfaction of the Sugarhouse 
judgment (R. 90-91). In addition, Anderson claimed to have 
no assets when in fact he had a substantial interest in the 
real property. He was to receive $2,000 from the sale of 
four acres and would have eight acres left thereafter. 
Under all of the foregoing authority, the agreement of 
Sugarhouse, based upon Anderson's false misrepresentations, 
was subject to rescission at Sugarhouse's election. Notice 
of that election was timely given and Anderso·n' s check 
returned. 
The trial court's conclusions that the agreement 
was supported by consideration and was valid and binding 
must be reversed. 
POINT II. ANDERSONS FAILED TO MEET THEIR BURDEN OF PLEADING 
AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 
After Sugarhouse rejected Anderson's settlement 
offer and returned their check on February 2, 1979, Ander-
sons served Sugarhouse with a pleading entitled "Motion" 
which was supported by an affidavit, dated February 8, 1979. 
The motion was not made pursuant to any rule or statute, but 
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simply requested the Court "for an order requiring the 
plaintiff to carry out and complete the terms of the settle-
ment entered into by the parties on January 31, 1979." 
Andersons appear to be relying upon an accord and satisfac-
tion to obtain the equitable relief of specific performance. 
Professor Corbin defines the burden and requirements of 
proving such a doctrine. 
Ac~ord and satisfaction is properly an affi~ 
mative defense; it must be specifically pleaded 
and the burden of proof with respect to every 
element of it is on the party alleging it as a 
defense. (A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, §1280 
at 134-5 (1962); footnote omitted.) 
The elements of accord and satisfaction are enumerated in 
Ralph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building and Loan Associ~ 
tion, 94 Utah 97, 75 P.2d 669 (1938), as follows: 
(1) A proper subject matter, (2) competent parties, 
(3) an assent or meeting of the minds of the 
parties, and (4) a consideration. (75 P.2d at 
676.) 
In Simmons v. Langston, 241 Miss. 36, 128 So.2d 
749 (1961), the Court, quoting Corbin on Contracts, held 
that the seller of an automobile was entitled to a defi-
ciency judgment against the buyer for the balance due on a 
repossessed automobile when the buyer failed to carry his 
burden of proving an accord and satisfaction. The Court 
rejected buyer's arguments that an alleged conversation 
between buyer and seller wherein seller made arrangements 0 
repossess the motor vehicle were sufficient to prove an 
accord and satisfaction. 
--
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The burden of proving an accord and satis-
faction is upon one who maintains the affirmative 
of that issue. It is said that the evidence must 
be "clear and unequivocal" in order to support 
such a finding. . . . (128 So.2d at 750; cita-
tions omitted.) 
Andersons were charged with maintaining the affir-
mative on the issue of proving an accord and satisfaction by 
clear and unequivocal evidence. Andersons' untitled motion 
of February 8, 1979, requesting the Court to enforce an 
alleged accord and satisfaction, appears to be inadequate on 
its face to satisfy the previously described burden. The 
motion and trial court record are devoid of any evidence of 
consideration that would satisfy the fourth element of the 
cause of action as described in Badger above. A record 
without clear and convincing evidence of consideration fails 
to satisfy the burden of the previously described authority 
and warrants a reversal of the trial court's order. 
POINT III.APPELLANT WAS NOT AFFORDED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR DIS-
COVERY TO DETERMINE THE PARAMETERS OF RESPONDENTS' 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
Sugarhouse obtained a judgment against Anderson 
for the default of a promissory note in the Third District 
Court, Civil No. 236307. On January 29, 1979, Anderson was 
served with an order in supplemental proceedings in the same 
case as the original cause of action. 
Anderson, on his own initiative and without man-
date of the Court, met informally with Mr. Petty of Sugar-
house on January 31, 1979, in an attempt to settle the 
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dispute. Based on Anderson's representations, the parties 
reached an agreement regarding satisfaction of the judgment. 
Anderson sought to enforce an alleged accord and satisfac-
tion by serving Sugarhouse with a pleading entitled "Motioo" 
requesting the Court "for an order requiring the plaintiff 
to carry out and complete the terms of the settlement entered 
into by the parties on January 31, 1979." No separate 
action was filed ~y Anderson to enforce the so-called "settl~ 
ment" as the motion was pleaded in the same case in which 
appellant obtained a judgment against the respondent. No 
complaint was filed by respondent in addition to their 
motion. No authority was cited as the basis for filing such 
an action. Prior to the hearing on Anderson's motion, 
Sugarhouse was not afforded an opportunity for discovery ~ 
determine the extent of Anderson's assets and liabilities or 
otherwise engage in discovery regarding the substance of 
Andersons' motion. Sugarhouse's objections to the Court's 
lack of jurisdiction and improper procedures and hearing 
were rejected by the trial court. 
This Court has held that the discovery provisions 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure should be liberally 
construed to simplify and streamline trial procedures and to 
eliminate the element of surprise in all civil litigation. 
See Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 U.2d 189, 429 P.2d 39 (1967}. 
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[The) purpose [of the Rules of Civil Procedure) is 
to make procedure as simple and efficient as 
possible by eliminating any useless ritual undue 
rigidities, or technicalities which may ha~e 
become engrafted in our law; and to remove ele-
ments of surprise or trickery so the parties and 
the court can determine the facts and resolve the 
issues as directly, fairly and expeditiously as 
possible. (429 P.2d at 40.) 
The Court proceeded to quote from Rule l(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Pr?cedure which prefaces the entire set of 
rules by stating that the rules "shall be liberally con-
strued to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determina-
tion of every action." (Emphasis added.) 
In a case factually similar to Ellis, the Court 
noted that the "avowed purpose" of the rules of procedure 
"is to establish the 'truth' and require 'full disclosure'"· 
See Ash v. Farwell, 37 F.R.D. SS3, SSS (D.Kan. 196S). With 
reference to Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, the 
Court noted that discovery "permits a more realistic ap-
praisal of the case and undoubtedly leads to settlement of 
cases which otherwise would go to trial." 
In commenting upon the propriety of the discovery 
request for the production of documents, the Court in 
Alseike v. Miller, 196 Kan. S47, 412 P.2d 1007 (1966), held 
as follows; 
Discovery has a vital role in our code of civil 
procedure with its notice type pleading and its 
basic philosophy that mutual knowledge of a~l 
relevant facts is essential to the proper disposal 
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of litigation and that prior to trial every par~ 
to a civil action is entitled to disclosure of all 
such information in the possession of any person-
unless the information is privileged . . . Our ~ 
code of civil procedure is to be liberally con-
strued to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action . . (412 P.2d 
at 1014; citations omitted; emphasis added.) 
Lawsuits to enforce an alleged accord and satis-
faction are usually commenced by filing a complaint where 
the discovery rul,es and techniques are made available to all 
litigants. The procedural posture created by the filing of 
Andersons' motion and the Court's denial of Sugarhouse's 
objections to jurisdiction, procedure, mode of hearing and 
denial of discovery, did not afford Sugarhouse a "just" 
determination of "every action" as mandated by Rule 1 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The avowed purpose of the 
Rules was thwarted when Sugarhouse was unable to require the 
full disclosure through appropriate discovery of the nature 
of Andersons' case and an opportunity to determine the 
extent of their assets and liabilities. 
The trial court's failure to apply the Rules of 
Civil Procedure to aid Sugarhouse in the defense of Ander-
sons' action based upon an alleged accord and ·satisfaction, 
is a basic denial of a civil litigant's rights as codified 
by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Sugarhouse Finance 
Company prays for reversal of the trial court's order, or in 
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the alternative, for a new trial, and that Sugarhouse be 
awarded its costs. 
DATED this 6th day of August, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MOYLE & DRAPER 
By~-::-:,---~--::,---=-~~~~~~~ 
Wayne G. Petty 
By~-=~---.-=,--=-~~~~~~~ Royal I. Hansen 
600 Deseret Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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